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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the implications of the circulation of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary
union. Does the circulation of this debt have the same monetary implications as the printing of
money by a central government? Or are the obligations of this debt simply backed by future taxation
with no inflationary consequences? We argue here that both outcomes can arise in equilibrium. In
the model economy we consider there are multiple equilibria which reflect the perceptions of agents
regarding the manner in which the debt obligations will be met. In one equilibrium, termed
Ricardian, the future obligations are met with taxation by a regional government while in the other,
termed Monetization, the central bank is induced to print money to finance the region's obligations.
The multiplicity of equilibria reflects a commitment problem of the central bank. A key indicator
of the selected equilibrium is the distribution of the holdings of the regional debt. We use the model
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This paper studies the in°ationary implications of regional debt in a federation. Consider a federation of
regions (states) in which monetary policy is centralized but ¯scal policy is determined at the regional level.
Individual countries, such as Argentina and the U.S., ¯t this description as does a coalition of countries
which delegate monetary policy to a single central bank, such as the European Monetary Union.
The recent experience in Argentina motivates an analysis of the link between regional debt and in°ation.
The Argentine province of Buenos Aires circulated about 1:8 billion pesos of interest bearing provincial
bonds starting in July 2001, during the currency board regime in Argentina. In fact, the notes comprising
this debt, called Patacones, were of small denomination and had almost the same size and a design quite
similar to the Argentine peso. The initial issue of Patacones were paid-o® with interest in July 2002. At
that time, about 2.65 billion pesos of new regional debt was issued with a maturity of November 13, 2006.
Interestingly, the province announced that taxes could be paid with this debt, evidently at face value. In
addition, the federal government issued 3.3 billion pesos of small denomination bonds called Lecops. Other
provinces have also issued small denomination bonds.1 Ongoing negotiations with the IMF have focused on
reductions in regional de¯cits and the termination of new issues of the small denomination regional debt.2
The need for some ¯scal discipline binding national Treasuries in the EMU was recognized early on,
leading to the various provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty limiting national de¯cits. However, it seems
almost impossible to enforce these provisions. France and Germany, the two biggest economies of the EMU,
breached the de¯cit ceilings in 2002, 2003 and plan to continue this conduct in 2004. But, on November
25, 2003, a majority of European Union's ministers of ¯nance voted against sanctions imposed on these
two countries.3 The issue now is how the European Central Bank will accommodate these rising de¯cits.
The turmoil surrounding the Stability and Growth Pact of the EMU indicates that designing enforceable
regulation of regional national public de¯cits and debts is not an easy matter.
These experiences in Argentina and Europe re°ect the interplay between di®erent government levels
within a country. But these interactions are a more general phenomenon: they appear within any country
with regional governmental levels, such as the states within the U.S., and in a monetary union, such as the
EMU, in which ¯scal policy is determined by individual countries. Thus, we are interested in addressing the
following questions:
² Is the circulation of debt by a regional government equivalent to the creation of money by the central
bank and thus in°ationary?
² Or, does the issuance of such debt lead to future taxation without any money creation and thus without
any in°ation?
1To create some perspective, nominal GDP in Argentina in the fourth quarter of 2002 was 342 billion pesos and the money
supply (M1) was 42 billion pesos in January 2003. We are extremely grateful to Maria Alzua for supplying us with these data
about the regional debt and to George McCandless and Carlos Zarazaga for discussions on this experience. The money supply
and nominal GDP ¯gures are from http://www.mecon.gov.ar/progeco/dsbb.htm.
2An IMF assessment of the situation in Argentina and proposed measures for reform are summarized at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2003/pr0309.htm.
3Financial Times, "EU sanctions deal leaves euro pact in tatters", November 25 2003.
2² What types of government interventions, such as limitations on regional debt, are required?
From a positive perspective, addressing the ¯rst two questions provides insight into the in°ationary
implications of regional debt, and answers the question posed in the title. The analysis also allows us to
evaluate various forms of intervention which, as we shall see, may indeed be welfare improving. Our theory
is therefore helpful in assessing the current ¯scal situation in Argentina and the ongoing debate over the
excessive de¯cits in countries belonging to the EMU.
We address these questions in an abstract monetary model of a federation sharing a common currency
where one regional government issues bonds so as to make transfers to its citizens. We show the existence
of two types of equilibria: one in which regional debt is backed by regional taxation and another in which
regional debt is ¯nanced by an in°ation tax. This multiplicity re°ects a commitment problem of the cen-
tral government. We thus argue that the in°ationary e®ects of regional debt must be determined by the
interactions of the market participants and cannot be ascertained a priori. From this perspective, policy
interventions may be useful to coordinate on a socially preferred outcome.
In one equilibrium, which we term Ricardian, agents in a region who receive a transfer from their regional
government save in anticipation of future taxes. As the regional debt is held largely by agents of that region in
this kind of equilibrium, the central government will not bail-out the region but instead allow it to default.
Anticipating this, the regional government will prefer to tax its own citizens to repay the debt. So the
circulation of these regional bonds does not lead to any money creation.
In a second equilibrium, which we term Monetization, all agents union-wide anticipate a bail-out by the
central government. Thus they all hold money and the debt issued by a region and, given this distribution of
debt holdings, the central bank will choose to monetize the debt. Anticipating this, the regional government
will not raise taxes to pay the debt but will choose to turn the obligation over to the central bank.4 Here
the circulation of regional bonds is analogous to money creation by the central bank. This monetization of
its debt will lead a region to run excessive de¯cits since the burden of the debt is shared by all regions.
The multiplicity of equilibria re°ects a commitment problem by the central government vis-a-vis the
regional government. If it were feasible, the central government would commit to never bailing out the
regional government. Absent this ability to commit, the desire to equalize ex post per capita consumption
across regions may lead the central government to bail-out a regional government.
A key distinguishing feature across the two equilibria is whether the debt is widely held in the economy
or concentrated with agents in the bond-issuing region. In the former case, there is a bail-out as the
central government will pay-o® the regional debt. Knowing this, the regional government does not meet its
obligation. In the latter case, the e®ects of the default are isolated as the agents in the bond-issuing region
are, in e®ect, defaulting on themselves. Consequently, the central government will allow default rather than
pay the obligation of the region. Anticipating this, the regional government will prefer to tax its citizens
4This theme of a region inducing monetization is present in related papers, including Aizenman (1992), Zarazaga (1995),
Chari and Kehoe (1998), Chari and Kehoe (2002), Cooper and Kempf (2000) and Cooper and Kempf (2001). Here that argument
is made in a setting with bonds and money. Further, those papers do not characterize the multiplicity of equilibria that may
occur. Inman (2003) describes the reputational game between the central authority and sub-national units, highlighting the
analogy of that game to the \Chain Store Paradox".
3and a Ricardian equilibrium arises. In all cases individuals are indi®erent with regards to the composition
of their portfolios: it is the aggregate distribution of holdings which is key to the equilibrium outcome.
To make the analysis transparent, the ¯rst section of the paper studies a real version of this problem. The
second section studies these same themes in a monetary economy. This basic commitment problem facing
the central policymaker emerges again though here we study the behavior of a central bank and its use of
the in°ation tax. We again ¯nd multiple equilibria which are di®erentiated by the holdings of regional debt.
The more widely held the regional debt, the more likely is a bail-out by the central bank. Though it is not
directly part of our analysis, it might be that small denomination debt, such as that issued by the province of
Buenos Aires, is more likely to circulate throughout the economy, thus enhancing the possibility of a bail-out.
In the fourth section, we o®er a discussion of policy remedies for the socially excessive debt-¯nanced regional
spending in the Monetization equilibrium. Some interventions, such as limits on debt or even dollarization,
may be socially desirable. The last section concludes. 5
2 A Real Game
Consider a two-period economy composed of two regions, indexed i=1,2. There are Ni agents in region i and
total population is given by N =
P
Ni. As the equilibria will depend on the fraction of agents in region 1,
we de¯ne ¢ ´ N1
N . Agents have endowments in youth and old age and have access to a storage technology.
For any individual in region i; the pair of consumption levels is denoted (ciy;cio). The lifetime utility
function has the following form: u(ciy)+v(cio) and we assume that both u(¢) and v(¢) are strictly increasing
and strictly concave.
Two levels of government are active: the government of region 1, denoted RG, and a central government,
denoted CG. These governments have di®erent objectives: the region 1 government is only concerned with
the welfare of its citizens while the central government considers the welfare of all agents living in the
federation. The RG makes a real transfer to region 1 agents in period 1 and can levy a lump-sum tax on
region 1 agents in period 2. The CG makes no transfers and can levy a lump-sum tax on all agents in period
2.
The game played by the CG and the RG is given in Figure 1. The timing of moves is the following:
² Period 1:
{ Young agents in region 1 receive a real transfer, denoted g1, from their government.
{ Transfers to region 1 agents are ¯nanced by issuing regional debt, B1 = N1g1.
{ All young agents make savings decisions in anticipation of period 2 government policies.
² Period 2:
{ the region 1 government chooses to tax region 1 agents to ¯nance its debt obligation or to pass
the obligation to the central government.
5The discussion of dollarization draws upon Cooper and Kempf (2001) and the arguments for constraints are related to the
points made in Chari and Kehoe (2002) and Cooper and Kempf (2000).
4{ if the region 1 government does not levy the tax, then the central government can choose to levy
an economy-wide tax to ¯nance the debt obligation of region 1.
{ if the central government decides not to levy this tax, then region 1 automatically defaults on its
debt and region 1 agents bear a default cost, denoted ·.6
Figure 1 Here
We search for sub-game perfect Nash equilibria of this game. Accordingly, the central government is
restricted to choices which are credible. Put di®erently, the central government may threaten not to bail-
out a regional government but these threats have an in°uence on the equilibrium outcome only if they are
credible.
Before proceeding, it is useful to characterize the planner's solution as a benchmark. Assume that the
planner chooses an allocation of consumption goods over time and over regions at the start of time given
the endowments of agents in each period, and given a technology that creates x units of period 2 goods per
unit stored in period 1. Let the objective function of the planner be the population weighted average of the
lifetime utilities of individual agents, ¢(u(cy1) + v(co1)) + (1 ¡ ¢)(u(cy2) + v(co2)), where cyi and coi are
the consumption levels of a young agent in region i in youth and old-age, respectively. Then the solution is
to equalize consumption of agents across regions and the optimal consumption pro¯le (cy¤;co¤) satis¯es the
Euler equation u0(cy¤) = xv0(co¤).
We term this the commitment solution as it corresponds to the outcome if the central government could
commit, at the start of period 1 before young agents make their saving decision, not to levy an economy-wide
tax to bail-out the regional government. Of course, in the extensive form game outlined above, the central
government does not have this commitment ability. We now turn to an analysis of the equilibria for the
game without commitment.7
2.1 Period 1 Optimization
Region i young agents solve
maxsiu(!y + gi ¡ si) + v(!o + six ¡ ¿ ¡ ¿i) (1)
where si is real savings, gi is a real transfer in youth per capita in region i, !y is the endowment in youth,
!o is the endowment in old age, ¿ is a common tax and ¿i is the regional tax. Savings takes two forms:
storage (ki) and the holding of region 1 debt (bi). The return on storage is given by x and, in equilibrium,
this is the return on regional debt as well. Assume that the only action is in region 1 so that g2 ´ ¿2 ´ 0.
The ¯rst-order condition for this problem is
6Though there is a default cost, we have no theory about the implications of default. Thus the default cost plays a very
modest role: we assume that · is negligible and use it solely to \break ties".
7Thus the problem falls within the general class of team incentive problems where the central government is the principal
and the regional governments are the agents. The structure of the problem is thus similar to the family incentive problem
and the infamous "Rotten Kid Theorem" as formalized in Bergstrom (1989) and extended in Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) and
Bruce and Waldman (1990).
5u0(cyi) = xv0(coi) (2)
for i = 1;2. The savings decision will depend, in part, on the taxes that young agents anticipate in period
2. Nonetheless, it is straightforward to see that as u(c) is strictly concave, s1 > s2.8
The composition of saving though is indeterminate as government debt must o®er the same return as
storage for an equilibrium in which debt is held to exist. Still it is important for characterizing the set of
equilibria to keep track of the distribution of debt holdings.












In a bail-out equilibrium, ¿1 = 0 and ¿ = ¢g1x = Bx. Savings by the two regions are given by the ¯rst-order
conditions anticipating this common tax. We show there is a continuum of bail-out equilibria, indexed by
the share of the debt held by agents in region 1.9
Proposition 1 There exists a bail-out equilibrium for µ 2 [0;¢].
Proof.
To characterize the set of bail-out equilibria, we ¯rst check the incentives of the central government
assuming the regional government has decided not to tax its citizens. We then check the incentives of the
regional government and the private agents in turn.
For the CG, let Wb and Wd denote social welfare under a bail-out and a default respectively. In a bail-out
equilibrium, the consumption of an old region i agent is coi = !o + six ¡ ¿ where the tax satis¯es ¿ = ¹ Bx.
Thus, Wb is:
Wb = ¢v(!o + s1x ¡ ¹ Bx) + (1 ¡ ¢)v(!o + s2x ¡ ¹ Bx) (3)
Under a default, consumption is given by ~ coi = !0 + kix. Using si = bi + ki and the de¯nition of µ, social
welfare under a default is:
Wd = ¢v
µ





+ (1 ¡ ¢)v
µ
!o + (s2 ¡





If µ = ¢, Wb = Wd. With a negligible value of ·, the CG will choose bail-out over default.
Next, we establish that k1 > k2 for any µ · ¢. At µ = ¢, b1 = b2 so that s1 > s2 implies k1 > k2.
As µ decreases, b1 falls relative to b2 and so k1 increases relative to k2 since s1 and s2, given by (2), are
independent of µ. Hence, k1 > k2 for any µ · ¢. Consequently, the derivative of Wd with respect to µ,
given by ¡[v0(!o + k1x) ¡ v0(!o + k2x)] ¹ Bx, is positive when µ · ¢.
8This re°ects two features of the problem: g1 > g2 = 0 and ¿1 ¸ ¿2 = 0. The result that s1 > s2 then follows from (2) as
u(c) is strictly concave.
9We are grateful to Marco Bassetto for discussions which led to the enhanced development of this section relative to an
earlier draft.
6So, Wb = Wd when µ = ¢ implies Wb > W d for µ < ¢. This implies that the CG will bail-out the
regional government for µ · ¢.
Anticipating this, the region 1 government will always choose not to tax for µ · ¢. If it did levy a tax
¿1, the consumption of region 1 old agents would be ^ co1 = !o + (s1 ¡
¹ B
¢)x since ¿1 =
¹ B
¢x = g1x.10 With
¢ < 1, co1 > ^ co1 so that the regional government prefers not to tax its citizens.
In anticipation of these choices by the governments, private agents' savings decisions satisfy (2) under
the expectation of ¿1 = 0 and ¿ = ¹ Bx. Thus there exists a bail-out equilibrium for µ · ¢.
The proof rests upon the basic intuition associated with the ex post incentive of the central government
to redistribute resources towards a more equal allocation. For µ · ¢, consumption levels are more equal
across regions under a bail-out than under a default. Consequently, the CG is unable to commit not to
redistribute resources. The regional government recognizes this and chooses not to tax it citizens.
There is a subtle point here. Total consumption in the second period is ¯xed, given endowments and
storage decisions. So, the redistribution by the CG increases the consumption of region 2 agents and reduces
the consumption of region 1 agents relative to the default allocation. Thus the redistribution per se is not
favorable to region 1 agents. Still, their consumption is higher under a bail-out than if they paid the entire
tax bill. Put di®erently, the analysis above shows ~ co1 ¸ co1 > ^ co1.11 The ¯rst inequality indicates the
lost consumption of redistribution and the second inequality indicates that consumption is higher under a
bail-out than regional taxation. In e®ect, the region 1 agents are able to take advantage of the desires of the
CG to redistribute consumption away from them.
Figure 2 Here
This is illustrated in Figure 2 which indicates the consumption levels of the old agents in both regions
under di®erent allocations. This graph takes as given the savings decisions of the agents and thus total
resources available for consumption are ¯xed, as indicated by the negatively sloped resource constraint. The
allocation under a bail-out is labelled B, the allocation under default is labelled D and the one under regional
taxation is labelled R. As seen in this ¯gure, the bail-out of the CG redistributes from region 1 to region 2
agents relative to the default allocation. Still this allocation is preferred by region 1 to the one achievable
with regional taxation.
2.3 A Ricardian Equilibrium
In this section we construct a Ricardian equilibrium in which the regional government uses its tax to pay-
o® the debt issued to ¯nance the transfer, g1. Thus ¿1 = xg1 and ¿ = 0 along the equilibrium path. In
equilibrium, the region 1 agents will save the transfer to pay for their future taxes: s1 = s2+g1. This condition
relating s1 to s2 is an immediate consequence of (2) under the expectation of a Ricardian equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There exists a Ricardian equilibrium for µ = 1.
10Since this defection of the regional government arises in period 2, the level of region 1 saving is the same as it is along the
equilibrium path. It follows that ^ c01 < ^ c02 since 0 < s1 ¡ s2 < g1.
11If µ < ¢ , then ~ co1 > co1. This implies that points B and D are distinct in the ¯gure below.
7Proof. To construct this equilibrium, we assume that only region 1 agents choose to hold region 1 debt.
That is, in the proposed equilibrium, s2 = k2 so that s1 = s2 + b1. Hence µ = 1. At the individual level,
this is without loss of generality as debt and storage have the same return of x. Given this conjectured
equilibrium, we check the incentives of the central and regional governments as well as the private agents.
Since the CG moves last, we check its incentives ¯rst. If the regional government deviates from the
candidate equilibrium and chooses not to raise taxes to pay the debt obligation, will the CG allow default?
Let Wb again denote social welfare if the central government bails-out the region:
Wb = ¢v(!o + s1x ¡ ¿) + (1 ¡ ¢)v(!o + s2x ¡ ¿): (5)
From the curvature in v(¢), using s1 = s2 + g1, and setting ¿ = ¢g1x from the CG's budget constraint,
Wb < v(!o + (¢s1 + (1 ¡ ¢)s2)x ¡ ¿) = v(!o + s2x): (6)
If the central government allows default then social welfare, denoted Wd, is given by
Wd = ¢v(!o + (s1 ¡ g1)x) + (1 ¡ ¢)v(!o + s2x) = v(!o + s2x); (7)
where the last equality again uses s1 = s2 + g1.12 In (7), the consumption of region 1 agents re°ects the
default on the debt they hold and the absence of taxation. Hence, from (6) and (7), Wd > W b.
Anticipating that the central government will not bail-out, the regional government can choose to tax its
own citizens or allow a default. If region 1 levies a tax, the consumption of its citizens is ^ co1 = !o+(s1¡g1)x,
exactly the same consumption that occurs under a default. With a negligible · the regional government will
prefer to tax its citizens.
Finally, from (2), it is easy to check that region 1 agents will simply save the entire transfer in order to
pay their tax obligations to the regional government: i.e. s1 = s2 + g1. Given the construction that only
region 1 agents hold region 1 debt, all agents have the same real storage: i.e. s1 = s2+g1 and s2 = k2 imply
k1 = k2.
So private agents are optimizing and neither the regional nor the central government has an incentive to
deviate. Hence there is an equilibrium in which regional debt is paid-o® by regional taxation.
It is important to understand more intuitively this equilibrium. From (6) and (7), the central government
is interested in the ex post distribution of consumption across agents in the di®erent regions. Since v(¢) is
strictly concave, the CG prefers a more equitable allocation. The result that Wd > W b re°ects the fact that
default delivers more equitable consumption across the regions than would a bail-out.
Note too that this is an isolated equilibrium. That is, for µ < 1, there will not exist a Ricardian
equilibrium. When µ < 1, the regional government will no longer be indi®erent between taxing its citizen
and allowing the CG to default. Instead it will strictly prefer default since, with µ < 1 some of its tax
revenues will °ow to region 2 agents.13
12As noted earlier, we are setting the default cost at 0 and using it only to break ties. Thus · is not in Wd.
13However, with · > 0 it is possible to support other Ricardian equilibria.
83 A Monetary Economy with Regional Debt
This analysis of the real game serves two purposes. First, it highlights the commitment problem of the
central authority within a federation. Second, it indicates that a central government will ex post use its
tax and transfer power to redistribute resources across regions. This incentive will be relevant even in a
monetary economy.
Yet the discussion of regional debt occurs in a monetary setting where the connection between regional
debt and in°ation arises from the use of the in°ation tax by a central government. Thus understanding
the interactions between the regional and central government in a monetary setting is important. Here we
construct an overlapping generations model. Instead of assuming there exists a central government which can
tax all agents, there is a central bank (CB) which can print money and transfer it to the regional government
to pay its obligations. In the overlapping generations model, agents live for two periods. Lifetime utility
is given by u(cy) + v(co) and we assume that u(¢) and v(¢) are strictly increasing and strictly concave. All
agents are endowed with !y units of the consumption good in youth and !o in old age. Agents have access
to a storage technology that yields x > 1 units of the consumption good in period t + 1 for each unit stored
in period t. In addition, agents may save by holding debt issued by the region 1 government. Finally, there
is a legal restriction that requires money to be held in proportion to the level of real storage, as in Smith
(1994). One interpretation is that access to the storage technology requires an intermediary which must hold
money as a reserve requirement.14
Agents live in one of two regions. As in the previous section, the key is the game between the region 1
government and the central bank (CB). There is a second group of agents living in region 2, whose government
does not issue debt.15 Nonetheless region 2 agents are important as their welfare is re°ected in the decisions
of the CB. Each young agent of generation t born in region 1 receives a real transfer of g¤ from the regional
government and that government sells debt of B¤.16 Governments are associated with a generation not a
time period; the regional government elected in period t sells its debt and then in period t+1 decides either
to tax the consumption of the old within its region or to turn the obligation over to the CB.17
Formally, we consider a extensive form game, played each period, which is similar to that in the previous
section. Here though the move of the central government has been replaced by a choice of the central bank.
² regional government either raises taxes to pay its obligation (pay) or not (no pay) and passes it to
the CB
² if the regional government chooses (no pay), the CB either pays the obligation, ¯nanced by printing
14We are grateful to Todd Keister for discussions on this point. Alternatively, we could assume there is a reserve requirement
on all savings, including the holding of government debt. If we assume that the regional bond has a small nominal value, as is
the cases with patacones, there is no need for it to be intermediated and thus no basis for a reserve requirement.
15In the context of Argentina, region 1 is intended to represent the province of Buenos Aires and region 2 representing the
citizens outside of this region. This simpli¯cation clearly misses the fact that other regions have also issued small denomination
debt. But the province of Buenos Aires accounts for about 60 % of the regional debt outstanding.
16Hereafter, variables with an ¤ are steady state equilibrium values.
17In fact, this is apparently without loss of generality since a regional government in period t has no in°uence over any state
variables that matter for future generations.
9money, or denies it
² if the CB denies the obligation, then the region defaults and its citizens su®er a default cost of ·.
This game is played in period t+1 by the regional government representing region 1, generation t agents.
Importantly, the taxation decisions associated with generation t agents are made in period t+1 after savings
decisions have been made by that generation.
We construct two types of steady states for this economy. In the ¯rst, which is an extension of the bail-out
equilibrium, the CB monetizes the debt of the regional government. In the second, akin to the Ricardian
outcome, the CB refuses to monetize and, in anticipation, the regional government taxes its citizens.
The co-existence of these equilibria again re°ects the commitment problem faced by the CB, as in the
real game. In the extensive form game, the CB has the weighted utilities of all old agents as its objective.
Accordingly, it is ultimately interested in equalizing the real consumptions of these agents. Whether or
not it allows default on the debt depends on the holdings of this debt across agents. In the monetization
equilibrium, the debt is widely held and allowing default is undesirable due to the default cost. But, if the
debt is held by region 1 agents, then default by the CB leads to more equitable consumption. This supports
a decision to tax by the regional government and thus a Ricardian equilibrium.
Thus which equilibrium will prevail depends on who holds the regional debt. Since, in equilibrium, agents
get the same return from holding the regional debt as from storage (i.e. default never actually occurs in
equilibrium), agents are indi®erent with respect to their portfolios.18 Despite this indi®erence at the level of
the individual, the outcomes in the two equilibria may be quite di®erent.
3.1 Equilibrium with Monetization
Here we construct a stationary equilibrium in which the CB monetizes the obligation rather than allowing
default. The agents anticipate this and adjust their saving accordingly. Further, the region chooses no pay
and sends the obligation to the CB. In equilibrium, the CB prefers monetization over default. There is an
interpretation of the patacones in this equilibrium. Their creation is ultimately in°ationary as the CB is
unable to stop itself from monetizing the regional debt.
Along the equilibrium path, each region 1 government transfers g¤ to each young agent of region 1.
These transfers are ¯nanced by issuing one-period debt each period of B¤ per capita.19 By the regional
government's budget constraint, B¤ = ¢g¤ where ¢ is the population size of region 1.
We begin with the optimization problem of a representative young agent in region i, period t. That agent
solves
maxki;bi;miu(!y + gi ¡ ki ¡ bi ¡ mi) + v(!o + kix + biR + mi~ ¼) (8)
where gi is the real transfer to each region 1 young agent. There are three types of savings: ki is real
storage with return x, bi is the holding of real debt with a real return of R and mi is the holding of real
money. We impose a legal restriction, mi ¸ ¸ki, to generate a demand for money. The real return on the
18Interestingly, the Patacones have traded at less than face value perhaps indicating that private agents place positive
probability on default.
19So here these variables are divided by total population, normalized at 1, and not region 1 population.
10holding of money, ~ ¼, is the inverse of (one plus) the in°ation rate. Along the equilibrium path, the in°ation
is anticipated by young agents.
Since the return on holding of money will, in equilibrium, be less than the return on storage, the reserve
requirement will bind: mi = ¸ki. Thus the return on storage, given the reserve requirement, is x+¸~ ¼
1+¸ per
unit placed in storage.20 In equilibrium, this must be the same as the return on regional debt, R.
With this in mind, the optimization problem simpli¯es to
maxsu(!y + gi ¡ si) + v(!o + siR) (9)
where si ´ ki(1+¸)+bi represents total saving and R = x+¸~ ¼
1+¸ . The optimal savings decision, which depends
on R, is denoted by si¤(R), and satis¯es
u0(!y + gi ¡ si¤) = Rv0(!o + si¤R) (10)
for i = 1;2.
Since only region 1 has transfers, set g1 > 0 and g2 = 0. This implies that s1¤ > s2¤. If, to the contrary,
s1¤ · s2¤, then the left-side of (10) would be lower for region 1 agents and the right-side would be higher.
This would violate (10). We assume throughout that si is strictly positive, i.e. wy is su±ciently large
relative to wo. Further, in the equilibria we construct, the constraint that ki ¸ 0 does not bind, i.e. B¤ is
not too large. The rate of in°ation is determined from market clearing and the activity of the central bank.
Monetization of the debt B¤ by the central bank implies
M0 ¡ M
p0 = RB¤: (11)
Here unprimed variables are current ones and primed ones are future variables. So, for any generation, M
is the current money supply and M0 is the future stock of money. Likewise, p is the current prices of goods
in terms of money and p0 is the future price. 21
A monetary equilibrium requires that the supply of real money balances (by both old agents and the CB)
equals the demand by the young who have to meet their reserve requirement. So market clearing implies
M
p
= ¸¹ k¤(R): (12)






p0 = ¸¹ k¤(R)(1 ¡ ~ ¼) = RB¤ (13)
where ~ ¼ =
p
p0.
These conditions for market clearing, along with the choices of young agents will characterize a steady
state equilibrium with monetization. This equilibrium is comprised of a vector of choices by agents in each
region and a rate of return on money: (k1¤;s1¤;k2¤;s2¤; ~ ¼
¤). Along the equilibrium path, given the constant
level of government debt B¤, there will be constant growth of the money supply, constant in°ation and thus
20Put di®erently, it costs 1 + ¸ units of consumption today to get x + ¸~ ¼ units of consumption tomorrow. Hence the return
per unit stored is the ratio.
21As we focus on steady states, we have ignored all the t subscripts.
11a constant real return on money, ~ ¼
¤. This gets factored into the return on savings so that R¤ = x+¸~ ¼
¤
1+¸ is
the return on savings along the equilibrium path and determines si¤. As storage and regional debt have the
same return, we can freely construct agents' portfolios as part of the equilibrium. We focus on steady state
equilibria where all young agents of region 1 holds a fraction µ of the outstanding debt: b1¤ = µB
¤
¢ .
In characterizing the individual decisions and market clearing, we have assumed an equilibrium with CB
monetization. There are no regional taxes assumed in (10) and all ¯nancing was through money creation, as
in (11). We need to check that this is an equilibrium by evaluating the incentives of the regional government
and the central bank. The following intuition underlies the proof of Proposition 3.
First, consider the incentives of the CB. Its choice about monetizing the regional debt in°uences the
current nominal money supply and thus may redistribute purchasing power across old agents. But this
choice has no e®ect on future generations since the inherited stock of ¯at money is completely neutral.22 So
the CB looks only at the welfare of the current old. If it bails-out, then social welfare, Wb, is given by
Wb = ¢v(!o + R¤s1¤) + (1 ¡ ¢)v(!o + R¤s2¤) (14)
in the steady state. If the CB allows default, then the welfare of the current old is given by
Wd = ¢v(!o + k1¤(x + ¸)) + (1 ¡ ¢)v(!o + k2¤(x + ¸)) (15)
since, under default, there is no return on the holding of government debt and no in°ation for this generation
of old agents.23
To compare Wd against Wb we have to compare the ex post consumption levels. As argued in the
proof of Proposition 3, the consumption allocation under bail-out is closer to the social optimum of equal
consumption and hence Wb > W d. Finally, we need to be sure that the region will pass the obligation to
the CB given that it recognizes the CB will choose to monetize, i.e. Wb > W d. Again this is intuitive: why
pay a tax which can in part be passed to other agents? This is formalized in the proof of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 For µ · ¢, there exists a steady state for a given of level of region 1 debt, B¤, in which the
central bank monetizes the regional debt obligation.
Proof. First, we argue that there exists a (k1¤;s1¤;k2¤;s2¤; ~ ¼
¤) which solves the conditions for a stationary
monetary equilibrium. Second, we check the incentives of the regional and central governments.
The existence proof relies on two equilibrium conditions: (13) and R(~ ¼) = x+¸~ ¼
1+¸ . Substitution of R(~ ¼)
into (13) yields:
¸¹ k(~ ¼)(1 ¡ ~ ¼) = B¤[
x + ¸~ ¼
1 + ¸
]: (16)
Here ¹ k(~ ¼) re°ects the dependence of aggregate savings and thus aggregate storage (given B¤) on R(~ ¼).
Denote the left-side of (16) by H(~ ¼) and the right-side by G(~ ¼). Clearly G(~ ¼) is linear with a positive
intercept. With B¤ ¸ 0, ~ ¼ 2 [0;1] from (13). H(1) = 0 and thus H(1) < G(1). Since both functions are
continuous, if H(0) > G(0), there will exist a ¼ which solves (16). We assume endowments such that there
22So while the stock of ¯at money is changing over time, it has no in°uence on the set of feasible consumption allocations.
23Importantly, we are considering a one-time deviation from a candidate equilibrium. As before, the default cost is assumed
to be negligible and is not included in Wd.
12is positive saving at ~ ¼ = 0. Hence for B¤ su±ciently low, H(0) > G(0) and so there will exist a ~ ¼, denoted
~ ¼
¤, solving (16). Given ~ ¼
¤, R¤ is determined and thus so are total saving and storage. This proof holds for
µ · ¢.
To see the incentive of the CB to monetize use (13) and b1¤ = B¤ µ
¢ to write the consumption of old
agents under monetization as
co1¤ = !o + b1¤R¤ + k1¤(x + ¸~ ¼









co2¤ = !o + b2¤R¤ +2¤ (x + ¸~ ¼









Write the consumption of old agents in region i under default as
~ coi = !o + ki¤(x + ¸): (19)
From these expressions, total consumption available to all agents in a given period is independent of
whether the CB choses to bail-out the region or allow a default. That is, ¢co1+(1 ¡ ¢)co2 = !o+ki¤(x+¸)
under both default and bail-out. Thus, if consumption allocations under the bail-out were more equal than
they are under default, (assuming that in both cases region 1 old agents had higher consumption), then the
CB would choose bail-out.
Recall that si = ki (1 + ¸) + bi. Since s¤1 > s¤2 holds by (10) for any µ, and b1 · b2 for µ · ¢, it
follows that k1¤ > ¹ k¤ > k2¤ for µ · ¢. Further, the consumption of region 1 agents exceeds that of region 2
agents in the monetization equilibrium since s¤1 > s¤2. So, in°ation redistributes consumption from region
1 to region 2 agents, (but does not eliminate the advantage in region 1 consumption). Thus, relative to the
allocation under default, consumption is more equal under monetization. From the strict concavity of v(¢),
Wb > W d and the CB will prefer to monetize rather than allow default.
Finally, we inspect the incentives of the region 1 government. Let ^ co1 denote the consumption of region
1 agents in the event that the region 1 government taxes the consumption of these agents at a rate of ¿1.
From the budget constraint of the regional 1 government, ¢¿1 = B¤R¤. Using this constraint to determine
taxes,
^ co1 = !o + k1¤(x + ¸) +
B¤R¤
¢
(µ ¡ 1): (20)
Note that in this expression the savings choices of the private agents are (k1¤;b1¤) since this proposed
deviation from the equilibrium occurs after private agents choose their savings.
There are two di®erences between this and old consumption in the steady state, given in (17). First, the






¹ k¤ ] =
B¤R¤
¢¹ k¤ (¹ k¤ ¡ ¢k1¤) > 0: (21)
Thus the regional government prefers to allow the CB to monetize the debt rather than tax its agents directly.
This result indicates the obligations of the regional government will be assumed by the CB. As a conse-
quence, the regional transfers are ¯nanced by an economy-wide in°ation tax, partially borne by agents in
region 2.
13As in the real game, the redistribution in the bail-out is from agents in region 1 to those in region 2.
With µ · ¢, the young of region 1 have more storage and thus hold more money. As a consequence, the
region 1 agents bear more of the in°ation tax. Still, the bail-out is preferred to payment of taxes by region
1 agents.
3.2 Ricardian Equilibrium
Here we characterize a second equilibrium in which the regional government prefers to tax its agents. In
this equilibrium the CB, given the opportunity to act, would not choose to monetize. Rather it would
allow default. In anticipation of this, the region will tax. Given this, the agents in region 1 save more and
thus pay taxes from this extra savings. In the equilibrium this extra savings is in the form of holding of
debt. Therefore only region 1 agents hold the debt. This concentrated holding of debt is essential for the
construction of the Ricardian equilibrium. It makes clear how the distribution of debt holdings matters for
the equilibrium outcome.
In this Ricardian equilibrium, assets like the Patacones issued by the regional government in Argentina
are not money in the traditional sense as their creation is not associated with increases in prices. Instead,
they simply represent debt, backed by future taxes.24
To characterize this outcome we return to the basic optimization problems and equilibrium conditions.
The representative young agent in region i, period t solves
maxsu(!y + gi ¡ si) + v(!o + siR ¡ ¿i): (22)
This optimization yields
u0(!y + gi ¡ s¤i) = Rv0(!o + s¤iR ¡ ¿i) (23)
where ¿2 = g2 ´ 0. Along this equilibrium path there will be no in°ation so R = x+¸
1+¸.
In the construction of this equilibrium, we assume that only region 1 agents hold regional debt: b1¤ =
B¤=¢;b2¤ = 0. Further, we conjecture (and prove in Proposition 4) that s1¤ = s2¤ + b1¤ so that k1¤ = k2¤.
There is a money market clearing condition that is analogous to (12). This condition will determine the
price level given the ¯xed money supply and the storage decisions of the agents.
To argue that there is an equilibrium with regional taxation and no monetization by the CB, we need to
check the incentives for the levels of the government and private agents. This is done formally in Proposition
4; we bring out the intuition here.
We start in the sub-game where the regional government has decided not to tax and the CB must choose
to monetize the debt or allow default. This is a deviation from the equilibrium we are trying to construct.
Social welfare under a CB bail-out is
Wb = ¢v(!o + k1¤(x + ¸~ ¼) + b1¤R) + (1 ¡ ¢)v(!o + k2¤(x + ¸~ ¼)) (24)
24In the model there is no rollover option. But, if this were possible, then with a limit on debt issues the game we outline
between the regional government and the central bank will ultimately occur.
14where (ki¤;bi¤) are obtained from optimal savings along an equilibrium path from (23).25 Here ~ ¼ is again
the inverse of the in°ation rate and in°ation is caused by the monetization of the debt by the CB. If the
central bank does not bail-out and there is a default, then social welfare is given by
Wd = ¢v(!o + k¤1(x + ¸)) + (1 ¡ ¢)v(!o + k¤2(x + ¸)) (25)
so agents avoid the in°ation tax but only get a return on their storage and money holdings.
The proof of Proposition 4 shows that Wd > Wb. This re°ects two factors which were present in the
proof of Proposition 3 as well. First, the actual resources available to distribute to the old agents is the same
regardless of the action of the central bank. Second, the central bank wishes to obtain the most equitable
distribution of consumption across the old agents since v(¢) is strictly concave. This is achieved under default
given that k1¤ = k2¤.
Anticipating this, region 1 will prefer to raise taxes rather than allowing default. Interestingly, in both
cases, the consumption of region 1 old agents is the same. Intuitively, the taxes they pay to the regional
government are just used to pay-o® the debt which they hold. But, by taxing, the regional government can
avoid the in¯nitesimal default cost.
Proposition 4 There exists a steady state equilibrium given B¤ in which the regional debt is held only by
region 1 agents and the regional government chooses to raise taxes to pay its obligations.
Proof. First, we argue that there exists a (k1¤;s1¤;k2¤;s2¤; ~ ¼
¤) which satis¯es the conditions for a
stationary monetary equilibrium. Second, we check the incentives of the regional and central governments.
In the steady state, the level of region 1 transfers to each young agent is g¤, the total per capita debt
outstanding is B¤. By the budget constraint of region 1, B¤ = ¢g¤ and taxes in old age are given by
¢¿1 = R¤B¤ so that ¿1 = R¤g¤. The debt held by each agent in region 1 is b1¤ where ¢b1¤ = B¤ and region
2 agents do not hold any debt.
In equilibrium, the saving decisions of the agents are given by
u0(!y + gi ¡ ki¤(1 + ¸) ¡ bi¤) = R¤v0(!o + ki¤(x + ¸) + R¤bi¤ ¡ ¿i) (26)
where R¤ = x+¸
1+¸. With ¿1 = R¤g¤, k1¤ = k2¤ and b1¤ = B¤=¢ clearly satisfy the ¯rst order conditions.
Thus the equilibrium level of per capita storage (k¤) satis¯es
u0(!y ¡ k¤(1 + ¸)) = R¤v0(!o + k¤(x + ¸)): (27)
Given the strict concavity of u(¢) and v(¢), and !y su±ciently larger than !o, there exists a unique k¤ ¸ 0
which solves this condition.
We now turn to the incentives of the central bank. We argue that if the region does not set taxes to
pay its debt obligation, then the central bank will not monetize. To see why, from (25) and k1¤ = k2¤, the
consumption levels of agents are equal if the CB allows a default. However, the allocation under monetization
25Recall we assume b2¤ = 0 along the equilibrium path.
15provides greater consumption for region 1 agents since they bear only a fraction of the in°ation tax and receive
full repayment of their debt.
Yet, the total consumption of the old is the same, regardless of default or monetization. Under default,
total consumption of the old agents is
!o + k¤(x + ¸): (28)
Under monetization, total consumption is
!o + k¤(x + ¸) + ¸(~ ¼ ¡ 1)¹ k¤ + B¤R¤: (29)
where the rate of in°ation is determined from the money creation needed to ¯nance the bail-out as in (13).
Thus if the monetary authority deviates and bails-out the region, the resulting in°ation cancels out the last
two terms in (29). Hence total consumption is the same regardless of default or bail-out.26 Since a bail-out
leads to a less equitable consumption distribution, the CB will prefer default to monetization.
Given that the CB will not monetize the debt, the regional government will tax rather than default. This
allows them to avoid the in¯nitesimal default penalty, ·. Under both regional taxation and default, the
consumption of the region 1 old is given by !o + k¤(x + ¸).
3.3 Choice of B¤
The equilibria described in the previous section take the steady state level of region 1 debt, B¤, as given.
We now explore the determination of this level of debt.
Let V (B) be the welfare of a region 1 agent if the stock of debt is B. In the Ricardian equilibrium,
the choice of B is, by construction, irrelevant for the welfare of region 1 agents. But in the monetization
equilibrium, this is not the case. If one takes, for example, the perspective that the equilibrium will be
determined by a sunspot process, then V (B) places some weight on the monetization equilibrium and the
remaining probability on the Ricardian equilibrium.27 Since welfare of region 1 agents is independent of B in
the Ricardian equilibrium, the only e®ect of B occurs when the monetization equilibrium is selected. Thus
we focus our discussion of the choice of B assuming the selection of the monetization equilibrium.
So consider
V (B) = u(!y +
B
¢
¡ s) + v(!o + s ~ R(B)): (30)
This is the level of lifetime expected utility for a representative region 1 agent in an equilibrium with
monetization. Here B is the level of debt per capita so that B
¢ is the level of debt, and thus the transfer in
youth, per young region 1 agent. The function ~ R(B) is the return on savings if the stock of debt is B from
the equilibrium with monetization, see (13). Our main result is that the regional government will prefer a
positive level of transfers given the positive probability that the central bank will bail-out this obligation.
26This result could have been anticipated in a stationary monetary equilibrium, where the real money balances of young
agents, which ¯nance the returns on old agents money holdings, are invariant to default or bail-out on debt held by the previous
generation.
27The timing might be as follows. The regional government chooses B and then a sunspot occurs which selects from the set
of equilibria insofar as young agents condition their portfolio choice on the sunspot. This timing may occur each period or just
at the start of time.
16Proposition 5 The solution to (30) entails B > 0.
Proof. Using the envelope condition and region 1 agents' optimal choice of s given B and ~ R(B), the
optimal choice of B by the region 1 government satis¯es
V 0(B) = v0(co)[
~ R(B)
¢
¡ s ~ R0(B)] = 0: (31)
To show V 0(0) > 0, we view both ~ R and ~ ¼ as functions of B, using ~ R = x+¸~ ¼
1+¸ and (13) rewritten as
¸¹ k( ~ R)(1 ¡ ¼) = ~ RB: (32)
Taking derivatives to calculate ~ R0(B), and evaluating that derivative at B = 0, where ~ ¼ = 1, yields
~ R0(0) = ¡
~ R(0)
(1 + ¸)¹ k( ~ R(0))
(33)
Substituting this into (31), recalling that with no debt issued s1 = (1 + ¸)k1, yields







Since k1 = ¹ k in a symmetric steady state with B = 0, V 0(0) is positive when ¢ < 1. Thus the optimal policy
of the region 1 government will entail a positive level of B.
Finally, we informally consider the situation where each of the two regions makes a favorable transfer to
its agents, hoping to shift the debt payment to the central bank. It might appear that the ex-post incentive
for consumption equality by the central bank will no longer motivate a bail-out once both regions issue debt.
If so, then such symmetric regional behavior could, by itself, eliminate the free riding problem. However,
the central bank's choice of a bail-out or default are obtained region by region, depending on the move made
by that region, holding the other region's decision ¯xed. Suppose, for instance that both regions made a
transfer in period 1, anticipating a bail-out in period 2. The CB's choice in period 2 between a bail-out and
default is made for each region separately, and thus considers only the amount of redistribution in a bail-out
relative to default regarding the debt of that particular region. Consequently, equally pro°igate behavior of
both regions will not eliminate the free riding problem.28
4 Policy Implications
The two steady state equilibria characterized above have very di®erent welfare implications for agents in the
two regions. Agents in region 1 strictly prefer the monetization equilibrium while those in region 2 prefer
the equilibrium with regional taxation. Thus, as indicated by Proposition 5, the region 1 will increase the
level of B above zero and will try to support the equilibrium with monetization. In contrast, agents in region
2 would act to limit region 1 and eliminate the monetization equilibrium. We consider proposed policy
measures from the perspective of these two groups of agents.
28We are grateful to Eddie Dekel for discussions this point.
17In this discussion it is also useful to recall the benchmark planner's solution. As in the discussion of
the real game, the ex ante optimal allocation entails equal consumption across regions in all periods of
agent's lives. This re°ects the symmetry of the economy, the strict concavity of u(¢) and v(¢) and the use
of population weights in the planner's objective function. The planner's solution can be decentralized either
by the selection of the Ricardian equilibrium or when B¤ = 0. Thus the policy remedies can also be viewed
as devices for supporting the planner's solution.
4.1 Restrictions on debt
We consider two types of restrictions. The ¯rst is on the total size of the regional debt and the second is on
the holdings of that debt.
The ¯rst restriction is a debt limit. If B¤ is forced to be zero, then there is no monetization. Clearly a
restriction of this form would be favored by region 2 agents.
Within Argentina, there have been numerous attempts to place limits on regional debt. But, not sur-
prisingly, not all regions are in favor of these limits. Interestingly, recent negotiations with the International
Monetary Fund have included a discussion of the regional ¯scal situation.29 As far as the Stability and
Growth Pact is concerned, many critics claim that the focus on actual de¯cits was ill-conceived and suggest
that limits be imposed on national public debts.
The second restriction is on the holding of debt. Suppose there is a capital control which makes it
prohibitively expensive for a private agent in region 2 or a ¯nancial intermediary intervening on his behalf to
hold region 1 debt. Then this intervention implies that monetization is no longer a steady state and makes
the Ricardian equilibrium the only steady state equilibrium. This restriction is in the interest of region 2
agents. Such restrictions on the holding of debt emulate a commitment device ruling out monetization.
In Argentina, the small-denomination debt of the Buenos Aires region, the so-called Patacones, issued
in July 2002 allowed for the repayment of public obligations using these notes. But no other regions appear
willing to accept these notes for payment of taxes. While this is not a policy that prohibits Patacones to be
held outside of the Buenos Aires region, this policy clearly reduces their attractiveness for residents of other
regions.
4.2 Dollarization
A commitment by the central bank not to bail-out any regional government would of course eliminate the
monetization equilibrium. This is precisely the provision included in the Maastricht Treaty in the case of
the EMU. But of course, this begs the question: what is the basis of this commitment power?
There is a more drastic measure, which has been recently widely discussed both by policymakers and
economists: dollarization. This entails the complete surrender of monetary sovereignty, say by Argentina to
the U.S., and not just restrictions on the supply of money.30 Clearly dollarization eliminates the possibility
29Details are available on the recent agreement between the IMF and Argentina, http://www.mecon.gov.ar.
30Cooper and Kempf (2001) explores the bene¯ts of dollarization as a substitute for the commitment power of a central bank
in a multi-region economy (call it "Argentina") without regional debt.
18of monetization by the Argentine central bank. But there are two important caveats.
First, there is still the possibility that the Argentine central government will bail-out by means of central
taxes. This corresponds to the real game analysis in section 2. As we have shown in that section, there are
still multiple equilibria, indexed by the distribution of debt holding across regions. Hence dollarization per
se does not eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria, nor does it eliminate the ability of a regional government
to exert (ex post) pressure on the central government.
Second, under dollarization, a version of the multi-region monetary economy studied above reappears
at the world level. Suppose that it is Argentina that dollarizes and adopts the currency issued by the U.S.
central bank. Assume that prior to dollarization, the U.S. had succeeded in eliminating pressures by the
states on the federal government.31 Now with dollarization, the U.S. is like region 1 in the model of section
3 and Argentina now behaves as the region 2 passive government and does not issue debt. There is one
important di®erence though: the U.S. central bank does not include the welfare of Argentina in its objective.
Clearly there is now a gain to monetization of the debt by the U.S. central bank since part of this tax
will be paid by citizens of Argentina. Does this imply that the U.S. central bank will be willing to monetize
in order to help U.S. citizens through an by in°ation tax partly paid by Argentina? More generally, what
are the consequences of dollarization for the existence of multiple equilibria in the world economy?
To study these issues we consider a world economy formed of the U.S. and Argentina. Under dollarization
the only currency used in the world economy is the dollar, issued by the U.S. central bank, here called the
FED. The U.S. Treasury is the sole active government (equivalent to Region 1 in the previous example),
making transfers to young U.S. agents by issuing debt and possibly taxing its old agents. Moreover we
assume that the FED and the Treasury only care about the welfare of U.S. citizens. Variables with the
superscript 1 now refer to the American economy, variables with the superscript 2 refer to the Argentine
economy. We denote by ¢ the fraction of the world population in the U.S. A fraction µ of the amount of
debt issued by the U.S. government B¤ is equally held by U.S. agents.
We ¯nd that dollarization indeed may support the monetization equilibrium. This is true if a su±ciently
large fraction of the debt is held in the U.S. Then the FED may be induced to bail-out the U.S. government,
and so doing will harm Argentine citizens who pay the in°ation tax. In other words, dollarization does not
solve per se the possibility of monetization. Again, the issue of debt distribution is crucial for the de¯nition
of the equilibrium in this economy. We also ¯nd that there is no longer a Ricardian equilibrium. The FED
will always prefer to monetize and thus the U.S. government never levies a tax on U.S. citizens.
In e®ect, dollarization solves the multiplicity of monetary equilibria but by eliminating the virtuous one!
These results are now derived formally.
4.2.1 The monetization equilibrium
We now construct a monetization equilibrium in which the FED bails-out the U.S. Treasury. Interestingly,
the conditions for this type of equilibrium are quite di®erent from those given in Proposition 3. Instead of a
31Exactly how this is done within the U.S. is an open question, but for now we assume that the central U.S. government has
adequate commitment relative to its states.
19monetization equilibrium requiring that region 1 agents hold a small fraction of the debt, under dollarization
the bail-out equilibrium requires that region 1 agents hold a large fraction of the debt.
Proposition 6 Under dollarization, for a given value of B¤; there exists a monetization equilibrium for µ
su±ciently close to 1.
Proof. To characterize the monetarization equilibria, we check the incentives of the U.S. Treasury and the
FED. Beginning with the FED, note that it takes into consideration the utility of old region 1 (American)
agents only. Hence the FED's choice of default or bail-out depends only on the consumption of region 1
agents in these two outcomes. As in (17), the consumption levels of U.S. citizens under a monetized bail-out
is
co1¤ = !o + b1¤R¤ + k1¤(x + ¸~ ¼









and by (19) for i = 1 under default:
~ co1 = !o + k1¤(x + ¸): (36)
The FED will choose to monetize rather than default i® co1¤ > ~ co1. From the above expressions:










Since ¹ k¤ ´ ¢k1¤ + (1 ¡ ¢)k2¤, this inequality holds for µ = 1. By continuity, it holds for µ near 1.
Therefore when µ, the fraction of debt held by U.S. residents, is su±ciently large, the FED will monetize
the U.S. debt. This is preferred by the Treasury since the di®erence in consumption level under bail-out
exceeds that under taxation of U.S. citizens, as in (21). Thus for µ near 1, there is a monetization equilibrium.
The relative gain of a bail-out over default from the FED's perspective depends on the relative in°ation
tax burden on U.S. residents. The more Argentine residents hold dollars, the more they bear of the in°ation
tax. The demand for money is proportional to the amount of capital held by Argentine residents. Therefore
the higher is µ, the smaller is the share of capital held by U.S. citizens and the larger is the in°ation tax
borne by Argentina.
Clearly this is a cost of dollarization for Argentine citizens, since they bear not only any Argentine taxes
to ¯nance their own public goods, but also the in°ation tax for the bene¯t of U.S. citizens. Cooper and
Kempf (2001) discuss the implications of a treaty between the U.S. and Argentina as an incentive device on
the U.S. central bank to limit the in°ation tax.
Note that we obtained the opposite result than that of the previous section. There, the monetary
authority, caring about equalizing consumption among regions, chooses the best way to redistribute from
region 1 to region 2. In the case of dollarization, as the FED cares only about the U.S. welfare, it chooses
the best way to redistribute from region 2 to region 1.
4.2.2 The Ricardian equilibrium
We now turn to the possibility of a Ricardian equilibrium. In contrast to Section 3, there is no Ricardian
equilibrium in this economy.
20Proposition 7 Under dollarization, for a given value of B¤; there is no Ricardian equilibrium.
Proof. In a Ricardian equilibrium, agents in region 1 anticipate future taxes and thus s1 = s2 + B
¤
¢ . As
both the U.S. Treasury and the FED have the same objective of maximizing the consumption of old U.S.
agents, the outcome of the game played each period will provide to U.S. agents the maximal consumption
level.
In a Ricardian equilibrium, the U.S. Treasury levies a tax on U.S. citizens so that the consumption of a
region 1 old agent is:
^ co1 = !o + k1¤(x + ¸) +
R¤B¤
¢
(µ ¡ 1): (38)
Suppose instead that the U.S. Treasury does not levy the tax. The consumption levels under a bail-out
(viewed as a defection for a candidate Ricardian equilibrium) and a default are given in (35) and (36),
respectively, where the values of ki¤ in these expressions is part of the candidate Ricardian equilibrium.
Comparing (38) and (35), bail-out dominates regional taxation for region 1, co1 ¸ ^ co1, since k
1
¹ k · 1
¢.
And the inequality is strict if k2¤ > 0. If k2¤ = 0, then the consumption under default is higher than that
under bail-out: ~ co1 ¸ co1 and thus default dominates the consumption under taxation. Thus there is no
equilibrium in which the U.S. Treasury taxes U.S. citizens since it will always prefer the outcome under
either a bail-out or a default.
This result stands in contrast to that in Proposition 4 in which there was an isolated Ricardian equilibrium
in which region 1 agents held all of that debt. In that equilibrium, the central bank preferred default to
a bail-out since the allocation under a default was equal across old agents in the two regions. But, under
dollarization, the objective of the FED coincides with the U.S. Treasury and so the payment of taxes by U.S.
citizens is dominated by either a bail-out or a default.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to determine the impact of issuing debt by a regional government in a monetary
union. Recent events in Argentina, (the issue and circulation of small denomination bonds by some provinces,
such as the Patacones), and in Europe, (the de facto demise of the Stability and Growth Pact at the end
of 2003), prove the necessity of a better understanding of how \soft" is regional debt in monetary unions.
Two leading views are relevant: (i) the debt is just a claim on future tax revenues and (ii) the debt is \like"
money and hence printing it is tantamount to the printing of ¯at money and thus was in°ationary.
Our analysis indicates that both interpretations are consistent with an equilibrium of our monetary
model. The multiplicity re°ects a commitment problem on the part of the central government. Without
commitment, the central government will ex post always redistribute consumption to achieve greater equal-
ity in consumption across di®erent regions. Depending on the distribution of the holding of the regional
government debt, this desire for redistribution may lead the central government to bail-out a region or it
may lead the central government to allow default. In equilibrium, the distribution of the holdings of regional
governments' debt has powerful e®ects on the incentives for the central government. The more even is this
distribution, the more likely it is that the central government will prefer a bail-out to a costly default.
21The commitment problem of the central government has some important incentive e®ects on the regions.
A bail-out creates a free-rider problem in that regional governments will have an incentive to run ine±ciently
large de¯cits in anticipation of a government bail-out.32 Not surprisingly, other agents in the economy will
have an incentive to erect impediments to this free-rider problem including: debt restrictions, limits on the
holding of debt by other regions and even dollarization.
As a ¯nal note, the analysis did not require that the regional debt be small denomination. Nonetheless
the paper does provide an explanation for the choice of denomination. As argued above, monetization of the
regional debt is more likely if that debt is widely held. From that perspective, small denomination debt may
be more likely to circulate outside a narrow set of individuals and banks within a region. Thus a regional
government may perceive a gain to issuing small denomination debt.
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